

What is the Value of Left and Right? Party Competition and Political Ideology in East-Central Europe*

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Abstract

What does left-right self-identification tell us about voters, and how do these ideological labels come to have meaning? We compare self-placement across 23 countries in Eastern and Western Europe. Comporting with previous studies, we find consistency between psychological traits and left-right self-identification in established democracies, but variability in young post-communist democracies. We then demonstrate a link between elite appeals and the meaning of left and right held by voters. Matching elite appeals to left-right self-placement in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, we show that messages espoused by political parties determine voter ideological orientation as a function of whether these messages are congruent with (or repugnant to) a voter's own psychological orientations. This research provides important insight into how ideology comes to have meaning for voters, showing that psychological motives are expressed by ideology in different ways across political contexts.

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1 Introduction

The terms left and right are ubiquitous in politics. Since defenders of the French *anciens régime* sat on the right side of the National Assembly of 1789, while supporters of the revolution sat on the left, these terms have structured discussions of politics in both popular discourse and scholarly study. Subsequent political development produced widely accepted definitions for left and right in advanced democracies: the left advocates for political change in support of a more egalitarian society, while the right favors the status quo and grants a role for certain inequalities.

How well does this travel outside of the Western political experience? Gaining an understanding of how people in different societies talk and think about politics is critical to developing broader theories of vote choice, public opinion, and political competition, both in the well-studied democracies of Western Europe and in newer democracies. Furthermore, as a practical matter, left-right placement is a widely used indicator of ideological position in comparative politics;¹ understanding how people use these concepts has a direct bearing on how scholars approach many questions in comparative politics.

This article examines the meaning of left and right across developing and established democracies in order to understand whether citizens on the left and right share psychological traits and, if so, how these labels come to be associated with certain traits. While some scholars, mainly focusing on advanced industrial democracies, find that left-right labels are rooted in the same underlying psychological motivations across all countries (Jost et al. 2003), studies focusing on the young democracies of East Central Europe (ECE) find no consistency in the meaning of left and right across cases (Piurko et al. 2011; Aspelund et al. 2013). We reconcile these findings by demonstrating that, even in ECE, left and right serve to organize the political world for voters and elites to the extent that self-identification with left and

¹See, for example, Huber (1989), Knutsen (1995, 1997), Kitschelt and Hellemans (1990), and Evans and Whitefield (1998).

right is reliably associated with particular psychological traits within each case. However, the specific meaning of left and right within a polity is a function of the psychological values to which parties of each side appeal, which may vary across cases.

We use Item Response Theory to map associations between underlying psychological indicators and left-right self-placement across 23 countries of Eastern and Western Europe. This analysis comports with recent studies showing consistency in the psychological correlates of left and right in Western Europe and apparent randomness in ECE, while bringing more cases, a longer time span, and a more flexible statistical methodology to the question. From there, we proceed beyond the findings of previous scholarship to the question of what explains variation in the psychological correlates of left and right in the new democracies of post-communist Europe. In a close investigation of the meaning of left and right in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, we show that the heterogeneity observed across these cases is best explained by the psychological values appeals of the dominant political competitors labeling themselves as left and right. Thus, we show that political competition in new democracies drives the meaning of ideological labels. In this way, our research builds off of work highlighting the partisan aspect of political ideology (e.g., Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Zechmeister 2006; Medina 2013), but goes deeper by grounding the argument in the same fundamental psychological motives that have been shown to explain ideology in across cases (Jost et al. 2003).

2 Foundations of Political Ideology

Political ideology plays a key role in democratic politics by helping to organize the complex political world in a way that engenders communication and accountability between citizens and political elites. The concept of ideology is, however, so flexible as to be difficult to grasp. Still, when it comes to both popular discourse and scientific study, political ideology is almost always collapsed into a single dimension: the left-right spectrum. This is an obvious

oversimplification of the multidimensional space of political positions, but it is useful in that by referring to positions on a single left-right dimension, political elites can make politics and their own positions more understandable to voters. In this way, this left-right “semantic space” helps to organize and simplify diverse political attitudes and evaluations (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989, p. 229). Consequently, this spectrum is the predominant space for party competition (Downs 1957) and structures the way people perceive the political world (Lodge and Taber 2013).

The social and political psychology literature on ideology has a long tradition of probing the meanings of left and right. Indeed, the notions of the right being more resistant to change (Huntington 1957), less comfortable with ambiguity or uncertainty (Tetlock 1983), and more authoritarian (Adorno 1950; Altemeyer 1998) have long histories. Over the past decade, scholars focusing on the advanced industrial democracies have documented stark differences between those on the left and those on the right in terms of deeply held notions of morality (Graham et al. 2009), strategies for dealing with new stimuli (Shook and Fazio 2009; Janoff-Bulman et al. 2008), and basic elements of personality (Caprara et al. 2006; Carney et al. 2008). Overall, the constructs of left and right (or liberal and conservative in the US) are widely-used, deeply ingrained, and commonly understood in Western democracies (Huber 1989; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989; Jost 2006).

Jost et al. (2003) argue that left and right, specifically, are rooted in basic human psychology and anchored in the same psychological motives cross-nationally. They posit that conservatism, or right-wing ideology, is “motivated social cognition” driven by deference to the status quo and a moral orientation accepting inequality in society. Likewise, an allowance for change and intolerance of inequality are attributes of the left. Jost and colleagues argue that political ideology provides a valuable service to individuals by fulfilling basic needs, and go so far as to posit an affinity between citizens and the ideology to which they are predisposed, arguing that “people can be said to choose ideas, but there is an important and reciprocal sense in which ideas choose people” (Jost et al. 2009, 308).

3 Left and Right in Post-Communist Europe

Though the empirical research on older democracies shows that political conservatism is rooted in resistance to change and acceptance of inequality, cross-national evidence for a direct link existing in the newer democracies of East-Central Europe is mixed. Jost et al. (2003) argue that, given the inclusion of Poland in their analysis, their conclusions hold for the post-communist world. A more recent analysis by Thorisdottir et al. (2007) largely supports these findings, showing that resistance to change is predictive of right-wing orientation in ECE, though they detect no relationship between identifying with the left and attitudes towards inequality in ECE. In a study focusing on Poland, Kossowska and Van Hiel (1999) find resistance to change to be positively associated with conservatism, as would be expected by the Jost paradigm. This also comports with long-established arguments in political science connecting right-wing orientation to the status quo (see Huntington 1957).

Notwithstanding this evidence, recent research shows that ECE is different with respect to the relationship between left-right ideology and underlying psychological values. Piurko et al. (2011), for instance, find clear patterns between left-right self-placement and values in the advanced industrial democracies of the West, but no such structure in post-communist Europe. Similarly, in examining whether political conservatism is rooted in orientations towards change and inequality, Aspelund et al. (2013) find a strong cross-national relationship in Western Europe, but no relationship in post-communist Europe. They show that the relationships between resistance to change and acceptance of inequality and right wing orientation varies widely across both cases and over time in ECE. Both of these studies, therefore, find little rhyme or reason to the meaning of left and right in ECE.

What explains the difference between left-right ideology in ECE and Western Europe? Does the lack of consistency observed in these countries reflect a true difference in politics or is it simply an artifact of an unsettled political landscape? There are several compelling reasons to believe that notions of left-right political ideology are—and will remain—fundamentally different in ECE. State socialist rule was a cataclysmic experience for the societies it occu-

pied, with homogenizing pressures so strong commentators wondered whether real societal divides existed to be represented in politics (Linz and Stepan 2011). While this *tabula rasa* hypothesis was unfounded (Shabad and Slomczynski 1999; Kitschelt et al. 1999), the communist legacy did leave anemic civil societies (Howard 2003) and flattened class divisions. The muted economic cleavage limited ideological differentiation on the class dimension critical to the structure of party politics in Western Europe (Zielinski 2002).

Compounding the weakness of historic ideological divides, voters in ECE are also exposed to multiple ideological cross-pressures. Indeed, there are a number of challenges to developing distinct and consistent left-right ideological positions in ECE. The simultaneous political, economic, and social transitions created a situation unseen (and thus unstudied) in the cases of the long-established advanced industrial democracies (Przeworski 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 2008). Moreover, ideology is closely tied to the nature of the status quo (Jost 2006; Huntington 1957), but the status quo is different in post-communist countries. Instead of an aristocracy of the right and associated inequality being an element of the status quo, as was the case in Western Europe, state socialism and relative equality were the norm in ECE. In fact, political change and reform are associated with significant increases in *inequality* in these countries. In other words, while right wing orientation is associated with a distrust of change and a tolerance of inequality, voters who are skeptical of change may well tend towards the political *left* in ECE, while simultaneously maintaining an intolerance for inequality. Indeed, Greenberg and Jonas (2003) argue that it is the political right—typically seen as wary of change cross-nationally—that advocates for change when the status quo is of the left. Similarly, McFarland et al. (1992) show that in Russia, resistance to change was a correlate of the left side of the political spectrum, not the right.

Another source of ideological cross-pressure is the disjuncture between stated party ideological positions and their actions, both in terms of rhetoric and policy outputs. Economic conditions in the young democracies of ECE involved highly competing pressures. On the one hand, enormous unemployment and the crumbling remnants of the bloated communist

state economies required intense austerity, while on the other hand this very austerity created majorities of newly empowered voters feeling the brunt of these economic changes (Cook 2007).

These competing pressures mean confusing trends in ECE when it comes to left and right. Indeed, parties have been extremely vague in terms of programmatic ideological platforms (Carey and Reynolds 2007), and left-right ideology is not an adequate predictor of how coalition governments are formed in ECE (Savage 2012). Lipsmeyer (2002) finds no relation between stated ECE government ideology and overall spending, and a positive relationship between pension spending and rightist governments. Tavits and Letki (2009) show that the actual policy outputs of governments on the right and left are not in line with their stated ideological positions, such that that governments ostensibly on the left have been more likely to promulgate the austere economic policies typically associated with the right, while parties of the right towed a populist line and produced policies that are more protectionist. Thus it is that if left and right are indispensable tools of political organization across the democratic world, post-communist Europe presents a very tough case.

4 Messaging and the Left-Right Spectrum in ECE

If left and right are not predicted by identical underlying psychological motives across cases in ECE, does this indicate that they are not anchored in the psychological dispositions of voters? This is unlikely given the ubiquity of the terms left and right in the political discourse of ECE. We argue that the meaning of left and right for voters is congruent with the appeals political elites labeling themselves as being on the left and right make. In other words, left and right serve as heuristics for groups of political competitors in ECE. A heuristic is a mental shortcut that enables a person to make quick judgments and decisions without expending time or mental resources. Though imperfect and frequently the cause of significant misjudgments, these simplifications are critical to human cognition and behavior

across numerous realms, and politics is no different. Indeed, Sniderman et al. (1993) see political ideology as one of the most important political heuristics.²

If the left-right labels serve as heuristics for understanding the contours of political competition in a specific country, messages from that country's political elites are key to understanding how these ideological labels obtain their meaning. Ideology has long been seen as deeply rooted in partisanship. Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) argue that the meaning of left and right is a reflection of partisan loyalties in older democracies, and Jost and colleagues posit that "the main factor governing mass acquisition of ideological content seems to be attention to and comprehension of information flowing from political elites" (Jost et al. 2009, p. 317). Medina (2013) supports this positions with recent data including cases from both Eastern and Western Europe, and adds that the degree of polarization in a polity helps account for the strength of the partisan element to ideological self-placement.³ Additionally, Zechmeister (2006) shows that "elite packaging," valence issues, and policy positions affect the meanings of left and right in Mexico and Argentina.

At the onset of mutliparty competition, voters have strong incentives to define the new ideological space, and political parties are most likely to act as the compass for the formation

²This function of ideology is a basic tenet of spatial models so prevalent in theories of political behavior dating back to the seminal work of Downs (1957).

³While both extant social cleavages and party competition will surely interact in a mutually reinforcing manner, a top-down process of elite actions affecting mass perceptions of the meaning of left and right seems more likely. Parties in the region did not bubble up from below out of civil society, but instead emerged instantly as cartel parties, promulgating platforms and appeals with an eye of attracting constituents and not representing natural groups of constituents (Mair 1996). As Tavits (2008) demonstrates, the formations of the party systems in the region seem much more tied to elite actions than anything among the masses.

of meaningful ideological discourse. Newly empowered citizens require a shorthand with which to understand the complex and tumultuous political events of democratization, and the terms left and right are the easiest tools for doing so. The actions of political elites will be the main source of information as to what these terms might mean, as in a young democracy, choosing between competing political elites is indeed the main goal of political information seeking. Furthermore, ideologies more easily attach to groups of people—such as competing factions—than to specific issues or bundles of abstract ideas. While specific policies often fail to provide ideological constraint even in a political system as established and stable as the United States (Converse 1964), social groups are an integral aspect of political orientation (Campbell et al. 1960). Indeed, citizens often personalize concepts as abstract as the state in trying to understand the political world (McGraw and Dolan 2007).

These factors make it likely that the left-right ideological labels serve as heuristics for locating political competitors. Parties in ECE emerged as cartels of elites competing for votes and placed themselves on the left-right spectrum with the goal of attracting votes (Mair 1996; Innes 2002). As they work to maximize their votes and represent certain constituents, their appeals, actions, and policies affect the notion of what left and right mean in the eyes of voters. This does not preclude similar psychological motives underpinning left-right political ideology in the region. On the contrary, it seems likely that the same elective affinity outlined by Jost et al. (2009) would take place. The underlying motives may be largely the same, but their specific projection onto the left-right spectrum is a function of dynamics largely unique to each state and its political actors.

This *message hypothesis* — that the psychological predictors of left and right are heterogeneous across ECE, with their meanings being determined mainly by the actions and appeals of elites and parties that adopt the left-right labels — helps bridge the gap between work on both sides of the debate over what left and right have come to mean in post-communist Europe. It suggests that the answer is neither complete adherence to the patterns observed in the advanced industrial democracies of the West, nor the apparent

randomness more recent studies uncover. Instead, the left and right ideological labels are meaningful representations connecting psychological motives to political divides in ECE; however, the specific manifestations of these representations are contingent on the dynamics of political competition within each case.

5 The Psychological Correlates of Left and Right

Given the conflicting evidence in the literature, and to lay the foundations for our argument that left and right serve as heuristics for individuals' understanding of political competition, we begin our analysis with an investigation into the relationship between voters' psychological orientations and their left-right self-placement across Eastern and Western Europe. Then, in Section 6, we turn to evaluating the *message hypothesis*.

5.1 Data, Measurement, and Model Specification

To operationalize psychological motivations, we use underlying human values as put forth by Schwartz 1992; 2001. We follow the example of Piurko et al. (2011) and Aspelund et al. (2013) by drawing upon the Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ)⁴ embedded in each round of the European Social Survey (ESS) to analyze the extent to which underlying values relate

⁴The 21 item PVQ battery in the ESS measures the 10 basic human values proposed by Schwartz (1992). This scale and the underlying value model it measures have been validated in hundreds of samples in over 60 countries (Schwartz 1992; Schwartz et al. 2001). Moreover, elements of this values schema have also been widely used in studies of left-right ideology in the West, with the values categories of conservation and self-enhancement being highly predictive of both right-wing political preferences (Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Cohrs et al. 2007) and other various psychological measures associated with political ideology, such as right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (McKee and Feather 2008).

to left-right self-placement. In their analysis, Piurko et al. (2011) used structural equation modeling to identify 10 different value dimensions in the first round of the ESS. Aspelund et al. (2013) use estimates derived from a separate study (Verkasalo et al. 2009) to uniformly project PVQ responses from the third (2006) and fourth (2008) rounds of the ESS onto a 2-dimensional values space. In contrast, our analysis employs individual Item Response Theory (IRT) models and the PVQ to operationalize four principal values dimensions—*Conservation*, *Openness*, *Self-transcendence*, and *Self-enhancement*—for respondents in 23 countries (15 Western European, 8 Eastern European) over all six rounds of the ESS.

Item response models provide key advantages over traditional data-reduction tools such as factor analysis. IRT models estimate factor scores directly instead of depending upon factor rotations and other assumptions (Treier and Jackman 2008, 2002), while also being able to accurately model the ordinal responses in the ESS data. Most importantly, though, is ability for IRT models to accommodate missing responses, which are common in the PVQ.⁵ We extract four dimensions that correspond readily to Jost et al.’s (2003) theory of the psychological determinants of conservatism, as our analyses reveal these four factors to be the best fit of the data.⁶ *Openness* and *Conservation* correspond to acceptance and avoidance of social change, while *Self-enhancement* and *Self-transcendence* relate to the acceptance or

⁵Between approximately 10,000 (4%) and 12,000 (5%) of each PVQ question went unanswered. Listwise deletion would have resulted in removing more than 26,000 (10%) of respondents from the sample. More details of the IRT models and the results are provided in Appendix C.

⁶Schwartz and Boehnke (2004, p. 251) show that using these four “higher-order” scales is often a desirable and valid alternative to the full ten dimension “circumplex” of values Schwartz proposes. This is particularly true in cases where statistical power is an issue, as it is here because the PVQ in the ESS contains only half of the full Schwartz value battery.

rejection of a role for inequality in society.⁷ A 2-dimensional model directly mirroring Jost and colleagues, such as that used by Aspelund et al. (2013), is potentially problematic for the ECE data because the questions that load consistently with particular dimensions in Western Europe do not consistently load with those dimensions in the post-communist world.⁸ The ten-dimensional analysis that Piurko et al. (2011) use, on the other hand, relies on only two questions for determining individual’s location on each dimension (three questions for Universalism). Given non-responses and measurement error, this asks too much of the data.


In order to understand the psychological correlates of left and right across Eastern and Western Europe, we use the four value measures estimated from the IRT models to predict participants’ left-right self-placement. We estimate a linear model for each country, where left-right self-placement is regressed on the four latent dimensions as well an indicator for the ESS round.⁹ The theoretical and empirical research discussed previously suggests that we should expect *Conservation* and *Self-enhancement* to be positively associated with right-leaning responses, while the *Openness* and *Self-transcendence* dimensions should be negatively associated with right-leaning responses, standing in for acceptance of change and intolerance of inequality, respectively.

⁷How each question in the PVQ maps to these four dimensions is provided in Table 1 of the Appendix. Questions in the PVQ were recorded on a scale from 1 to 6, with 1 being the highest level of agreement with the statement. For the purpose of our analyses, this order was reversed.

⁸This finding is consistent with Piurko et al. (2011).

⁹Left-right self-placement was recorded on a scale from 0 to 10. While a strictly ordinal, rather than interval, scale, there were enough categories (11) that moving to an ordered logit would not provide any advantage and would needlessly complicate the interpretation of the models. That said, a set of ordered logit models were estimated and the results were in line with the OLS estimated presented here.

Figure 1: The Relationship Between Left-Right Self-Placement and Estimated Values Orientations in Europe, ESS 2002–2012. The figure presents OLS point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for a regression of left-right self-placement on estimates of respondent psychological orientations in Europe. Respondent psychological orientations were estimated from graded IRT models using the Schwartz PVQ embedded in the ESS.



5.2 Results

Figure 1 presents the results of these models for each of the 23 Eastern and Western European countries in the study. In the figure, the vertical axis represents the estimated coefficient value and the horizontal axis indicates the country. Point estimates for each value dimension and 95% confidence intervals are provided. Because higher values of the measure for left-right self-placement indicate positions farther to the right, positive coefficients indicate a value dimension that predicts identifying on the right. Negative coefficients indicate that the value dimension is correlated with left leaning ideological placement. Western European countries are positioned on the left side of each panel, while the shaded region on the right of each panel highlights the estimates for post-communist Europe.

The results comport with those of Piurko et al. (2011) and Aspelund et al. (2013). That is, the expected psychological motivations predict identification on the left-right ideological scale in the older democracies of Western Europe, but not in post-communist countries. With the exception of Cyprus (a relatively young democracy compared to other Western European countries), the patterns agree with Jost’s model of political ideology. *Conservation* and *Self-transcendence* conform to the model most closely, with the former powerfully predicting right-leaning orientation and the latter predicting a left-leaning orientation. *Self-enhancement* also conforms to the expectations, typically predicting self-placement on the right in the models for Western Europe. In the case of *Openness*, no clear-cut pattern emerges in the Western European data, but the coefficient values are small and the overall picture in Western Europe remains largely consistent with psychological theories of political ideology.¹⁰

In contrast, there is no consistent relationship between underlying value dimensions and left-right self-placement in the new democracies of ECE. Moreover, where the relationships between values and an ideological label are strongest (notably in the Czech Republic and Slovakia), they run in the *opposite* direction to what we would expect given the work on ideology in the West. For instance, whereas *Conservation* should predict self-placement on the right, in the Czech and Slovak cases it is a strong predictor of self-placement on the *left*. The opposite is true of *Openness* in these two cases; greater adherence to this value should be an attribute of the left, but in the Czech and Slovak Republics it is in fact an attribute of those that place themselves on the right. Our analysis does not lend credence to Jost et al.’s (2003) argument that the same psychological motivations anchor left and right in ECE as in the advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe. This begs the question, what, if anything, do left and right mean in the eyes of voters in post-communist democracies?

¹⁰The standard deviation for each of the latent values estimates was approximately 0.9. Consequently, a coefficient value of 0.5 for a value indicates an increase in self-placement of just under 0.5 for each standard deviation increase in the latent value.

6 Testing the Messaging Hypothesis

To reiterate, our *messaging hypothesis* predicts that left and right obtain their meaning from the way political parties associated with the left and right appeal to voters. Thus, left and right do express psychological motivations in ECE as in Western Europe as Jost et al. (2003) argue, but their specific meanings depend upon idiosyncratic elements of political competition within each country, helping to explain the lack of a pattern others have observed (Aspelund et al. 2013; Piurko et al. 2011). This hypothesis posits that left and right are useful labels for communication between voters and elites within each case, but does not entail cross-national consistency in terms of how left and right correlate with psychological motivations. In other words, the specific values the left-right labels are associated with in a particular country is a function of how parties appeal to underlying psychological needs.

To test this hypothesis we model the level of agreement between parties and individuals on the left-right spectrum as a function of their level of agreement on the values (*Conservation*, *Openness*, *Self-enhancement*, and *Self-transcendence*) discussed in previous sections. When agreement is high between an individual and a particular party on their values, the messaging hypothesis predicts that the self-placement of the individual on the left-right spectrum would likewise be in agreement with the position of the party. For example, we would typically expect a party perceived as right-leaning to promote *Conservation* values. In this case, respondents that also score highly on *Conservation* will be more likely to place themselves on the right side of the left-right scale. However, the messaging hypothesis does *not* imply a fixed relationship between values and left-right. If a party perceived as *left*-leaning promotes *Conservation* values, voters scoring high on that value should place themselves on the political *left*.

6.1 Data, Measurement, and Model Specification

To test the messaging hypothesis we focus on the Visegrad Four: Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak Republics. These cases are ideal for our purposes because they share many

attributes. They are all democracies that started the transition from state socialism with robust anti-communist opposition movements, and all four cases joined the European Union in 2004. However, as our results from Section 5 show, they also provide ample variation in terms of the relationship between psychological traits and left-right placement; left and right apparently mean different things across these frequently compared cases

Our test requires that we supplement the European Social Survey data from the previous analysis of individual values with data appropriate for capturing party left-right placement as well as the values expressed by each party. In this analysis, we draw on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey for the measurement of each party’s left-right placement and the Comparative Manifestos Project to capture party values.

6.1.1 Dependent Variable: Proximity on the Left-Right Scale

Testing the messaging hypothesis requires a measure of congruence between an individual’s position on the left-right scale and a similar measure for the position of each party. A measure of individual’s position on the scale is readily attainable from the left-right self-placement responses available in the ESS data analyzed in the previous section. A measure of parties’ left-right placement, on the other hand, must come from an independent source in order to capture the ideological positions that each party claims for itself. For this we rely upon expert left-right placement of political parties from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (henceforth, CHES; Bakker et al. 2012). Though expert placement of parties on the left and right is only an approximation of the latent value of how these parties are perceived, it is an accurate approximation as these political experts best understand the contours of party competition in each case. Moreover, these expert respondents are themselves important contributors to the discourse of left and right that we want to measure.

Individual ideological self-placement on the ESS and the expert party ideological placement in the CHES were both measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating placement all the way to the left, 5 a position exactly in the middle of the ideological spec-

trum, and 10 placement as far to the right as possible. From these measures of left-right we calculated the absolute difference between the individual’s self-placement and the CHES placement of each party. With this measure of congruence—which ranged from approximately 0 to 9.5, with an average of 2.6—an increase indicates a greater distance between the individual and the party on the left-right spectrum, while lower values indicate that an individual places herself on the left-right spectrum close to the position of a given party (details can be found in Appendix B).

6.1.2 Explanatory Variable: Agreement on Values

Our explanatory variable of interest is agreement between individuals and parties on the four Schwartz values. For individuals, we adopt the measures derived from our item response models in Section 5. For parties, we construct measures from the Comparative Manifestos Project (henceforth CMP; Volkens et al. 2014) on the content of the platforms of each party. CMP coders break each party platform into individual statements and then categorize each as belonging to one topic out of an extensive coding scheme. Coders then divide the total number of statements in the manifesto by the number of statements dedicated to each topic. The resulting measures capture the proportion of each party manifesto dedicated to each topic in a given election. From these measures we created indices based upon the Schwartz theory of human values.

While the CMP data have several critics and are not appropriate as measures of concrete issue positions (see Gemenis 2013), these measures are useful as indicators of the salience of particular aspects of politics (Budge 2001). This is in line with our theoretical argument, which holds that as parties identified with one or the other side of the left-right spectrum make certain values salient, citizens identifying with this value will come to self-identify with that side of the spectrum. Thus, they provide an unbiased, though rough, approximation of the party value appeals we seek to explore. Moreover, the bias introduced by using the CMP data is against supporting the messaging hypothesis. Because these measures pick up

what is posted in official manifestos, they are often criticized for missing out on what parties actually do. While we hypothesize that both actions and appeals influence the meaning of left and right in the eyes of voters, actions are arguably more influential to most voters.

To generate measures from the CMP data, we match statement categories to the four Schwartz values. We then construct an additive index of these categories for each of the parties and center and scale by their standard deviations. This process requires that we make numerous coding decisions. In our coding scheme we err on the side of inclusive indices in order to provide the most comprehensive analysis possible (see Appendix D). This is largely because the frequency of any given individual CMP measure varied widely across both cases and time. Stable measures require that we make the indices widely inclusive. However, this had the drawback of sacrificing some precision for stability.¹¹

With the individual and party values indices in hand, we constructed measures of agreement between individuals and parties on the four values in a similar way to left-right agreement by calculating the absolute difference between individuals' and parties' values. As with the measure of left-right agreement, an increase in these measures indicates greater *disagreement* between the party and respondent.

¹¹The inclusion of the economic measures was a particularly difficult decision given the expectation that economic and social values may be at odds in the region compared to Western expectations (Zielinski 2002), but given the critical importance of these issues in the long transition away from state socialism they merit inclusion. Analyses with different values indices yield identical results to those presented below.

6.1.3 Model Specification and Estimation

We estimate the relationship between values-agreement and the agreement in left-right scale using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model (Zellner 1962).¹² We rely upon the SUR model because it allows us to take into consideration the dependence in the response variable, which is more efficient than a standard OLS model under such dependencies and reflects the fact that distance on left-right between parties and individuals is the result of competition between multiple parties simultaneously. To understand the source of this dependence, take for example a case with two parties and one value. If the parties' positions on the values measure are known, say $p_1 = 0.7$ and $p_2 = 0.1$, while the distances between the parties and the individual are also known, say $d_1 = 0.5$ and $d_2 = 0.1$, then the value for the individual is uniquely determined; in this example, the individual's value on the measure would be 0.2.

We estimate a SUR model for each country-round of the ESS in Stan (Stan Development Team 2013),¹³. Since the left-right distances are highly skewed, we include the square root of the response variable—the distance between individuals and parties on the left-right scale—in the model. We also include an intercept for each party in the model to account for the baseline agreement in each survey.¹⁴

¹²For political science applications of the SUR model, see Tomz et al. (2002) and Jackson (2002).

¹³An example of the model code is available in Appendix F. Stan version 2.6.0 was used for all models.

¹⁴Relatively diffuse priors were specified and twelve chains were run until the \hat{R} convergent diagnostic (Gelman and Rubin 1992) was below 1.05 for every parameter and the effective number of samples was above 1000 (3600 raw samples were taken for each parameter). See Appendix E for further details.

6.2 Results

Figures 2–5 show the results from the SUR models estimating the relationship between individual-party agreement on the four value dimensions and on left-right placement. Each of the four figures shows estimated posterior means for the estimates' slope parameters on the vertical axis, while the ESS round is indicated on the horizontal axis. Pluses denote positive and significant estimates, while minuses indicate significant, negative estimates. Red symbols indicate significance at the 95% level, grey at the 90% level. Light grey circles indicate non-statistically significant results.¹⁵


The statistical results are consistent with the messaging hypothesis.¹⁶ The estimates indicate that, on average, a greater distance between a party and an individual on a particular value is associated with a greater distance in left-right placement. In other words, if parties emphasize values that are distant from the views of an individual, the individual is, on average, less likely to place themselves close to that party on the left-right spectrum. Conversely, closeness on a value is associated with closeness on the left-right spectrum.

While the direction of the estimated coefficients support the messaging hypothesis, in many cases the substantive significance of these variables is also significant. Recall that the response variable ranged from 0 to approximately 3.1 (0 to 9.47 in raw distances), while the covariates ranged from 0 to just above 6 (see Appendix B.) With a coefficient estimate of 0.05, moving from the minimum to the maximum distance on a covariate is associated with

¹⁵Significance was determined by comparing the appropriate quantile value for the posterior distribution of the selected parameter to zero. For instance, if the 2.5% quantile was positive, then the estimate was seen to be positive and significant at the 95% level; i.e., it was plotted as a red plus sign.


¹⁶The number of positive versus negative and significant (at 90% level) coefficients was: 23 positive, 6 negative in the Czech Republic; 10 positive, 6 negative in Hungary; 22 positive, 12 negative in Poland; and 11 positive and 8 negative in Slovakia.

Figure 2: Explaining Respondent-Party Left-Right Agreement in Czech Republic. Posterior means (vertical axis) plotted for each party and round. A red plus (minus) indicates a posterior mean that is positive (negative) and significant at the 95% confidence level; a grey plus (minus) indicates significance at the 90% level. Light grey circles are non-significant estimates.



an increase on the left-right measure of agreement of 0.3, or around 10% of the range in the response variable. Similarly, a coefficient of 0.10, is associated with a change of 0.6, or 20% of the range of the response. Overall, from the posterior means presented in the figures we


Figure 3: Explaining Respondent-Party Left-Right Agreement in Hungary. Posterior means (vertical axis) plotted for each party and round. A red plus (minus) indicates a posterior mean that is positive (negative) and significant at the 95% confidence level; a grey plus (minus) indicates significance at the 90% level. Light grey circles are non-significant estimates.



can see that 36 of the positive and significant results are above 0.05 in magnitude.


Turning to the specific country results, we see that results for the Czech Republic and Poland are particularly clear. From the Czech results in Figure 2, it is clear that distance on Openness and Self-enhancement are closely associated with distance on left-right agree-

Figure 4: Explaining Respondent-Party Left-Right Agreement in Poland. Posterior means (vertical axis) plotted for each party and round. A red plus (minus) indicates a posterior mean that is positive (negative) and significant at the 95% confidence level; a grey plus (minus) indicates significance at the 90% level. Light grey circles are non-significant estimates.



ment. For *Openness*, this association holds for nearly all ESS rounds and parties, for *Self-enhancement* the relationship is strongest in periods 2 and 4. There is also a clear positive relationship between distance on *Conservation* and left-right agreement, especially in the latter three ESS rounds, while there is no evidence for the importance of *Self-transcendence*.

Figure 5: Explaining Respondent-Party Left-Right Agreement in Slovakia. Posterior means (vertical axis) plotted for each party and round. A red plus (minus) indicates a posterior mean that is positive (negative) and significant at the 95% confidence level; a grey plus (minus) indicates significance at the 90% level. Light grey circles are non-significant estimates.



The results for Poland, shown in Figure 4, also provide strong support for the messaging hypothesis. In this case, distance on *Conservation* and *Openness* are most associated with distance on left-right, though some evidence is also provided by *Self-enhancement* (except in ESS round 2). *Self-transcendence* in the Polish case is, however, something of an outlier,

demonstrating an overall pattern of being *negatively* associated with agreement on left-right. It is hard to make clear sense of this, but it is likely related to the strong, cross-cutting nature of the social liberal-conservative cleavage in the country (e.g., see Markowski 1997, 236).

A significant pattern in the SUR results for Czech Republic and Poland, specifically related to the previous IRT results, illuminates the messaging hypothesis in action. While the received wisdom in study of the psychology of ideology holds that *Conservation* is an attribute of people on the right side of the political spectrum, this is not the case in the Czech Republic. As the IRT results and Figure 1 shows, *Conservation* strongly predict self-placement on the *left*, not the *right*, in the Czech Republic. However, it is also the case that Czech parties associated with the left side of the political spectrum promulgate policies that fall within the realm of conservation values, while parties on the right are less likely to do so. Thus, the clear positive relationship between left-right agreement and *Conservation* shown in Figure 2 confirms that those who value conservation values are likely to share their location on the ideological scale similar to that of parties that promulgate these values; that is to say, both these voters and parties are on the *left*.

Congruence on the *Conservation* dimension is also an aspect of ideology in Poland, but in the opposite substantive direction from the Czech Republic. Here the values of *Conservation* are promulgated by the parties associated with the right. Likewise, Poles surveyed by the ESS who identify with this value are more likely to place themselves on the right. Why is this? The Polish Catholic Church remained one of the country's most important institutions even through the communist period. Thus, it anchored both the anti-communist element of the right as well as the right's moral elements such that to be on the right side of the ideological spectrum in Poland conforms much more closely to Western preconceptions of right-leaning conservative values. As one of the world's most secular countries, the Czech Republic lacks this religious pole. There the right is more associated with the anti-communist, anti-authoritarian movement, leading to right more grounded in the values of *Openness*. While *Conservation* as an element of leftist politics situation may

appear backwards from the outside, it is meaningful from the perspective of Czech voters and parties. As these examples illustrate, it is possible for left and right to be meaningfully rooted in the psychological motives of voters within two countries but for the psychological correlates of left and right to be idiosyncratic to each case.

The results for Hungary and Slovakia are somewhat weaker than those for the Czech Republic and Poland though. Broadly speaking, patterns for these countries also support the messaging hypothesis. For Hungary, the results are strongest for *Self-transcendence*, though the rest of estimates show little clear pattern. This is likely a reflection of how politics have evolved over the last decade and a half in the country, particularly the collapse of the political left and the strong shift to a greater focus on nationalism. For Slovakia, *Conservation* provides the strongest support for the hypothesis, though it is not nearly as strong as in the Czech Republic and Poland. As with Hungary, the weaker association of the psychological orientations with left-right self-placement may be related to the peculiar politics of the country, specifically the stunting democratic development during Mečiar period.

While the link between distance on values and that on left-right placement is not as strong in Hungary and Slovakia as it appears to be for the Czech Republic and Poland, the pattern seen in the SUR models is encouraging. Post-communist party politics are messy. The fragmentation of ECE party systems has meant that messages coming from the multiple of parties on the left and right often conflict and contradict one another. Moreover, the frequent emergence of populist and personalistic parties—which rarely fit neatly into the traditional left-right space—has further complicated the messages voters receive. In other words, ECE is a hard cases for the development of clear links between values and ideological labels. However, as the these results seem to indicate, such consistent links rooted in psychological motives do appear to be developing.

Finally, a short comment should be made regarding the variance we seen in the results over time; for example, why in the Czech Republic the distance on *Conservation* seems less associated with left-right agreement in earlier surveys, but appear to become more closely

linked in the later periods. Simply put, this should not be surprising. Along with the emergence of new parties, the changing salience and emergence of different political issues (e.g., the EU), is likely to complicate party politics. In this environment, we should *expect* to see volatility in the results.

7 Conclusion

The link between left-right self-placement and ideological orientations in the young democracies of East-Central Europe is not random. On the contrary, within individual post-communist countries, the notions of left and right make sense. As we have argued, voters come to associate the ideological terms left and right with the values promulgated by the major political actors in their country. For example, when parties positioning themselves on the “left” of the political spectrum profess conservation values—e.g., resistance to change—citizens holding those same values will begin to associate themselves with the left side of the spectrum. On the other hand, if a party on the “right” emphasizes such values, citizens holding those values will consider themselves to be on the political right. In simple terms, this messaging hypothesis states that people identify the values orientations of parties and then select their position on the left-right spectrum to match the unique politics of their country.

Our findings speak directly to the debate surrounding the meaning of left and right in the new democracies of post-communist Europe. Our argument and evidence provide a common ground between conflicting views of the meaning of ideological labels in these countries. On the one hand, there are those who claim that the same psychological orientations motivate the meaning of these labels in these new democracies as they do in Western Europe (Jost et al. 2003). On the other hand, there is more recent work that shows this is not the case; instead, these competing studies show great variation across cases in post-communist Europe when it comes to the meaning of left and right. For instance, in some cases conservatism

is associated with the right and in some with the left. These studies have taken this as evidence that left and right do not mean anything, but we have shown the plausibility of a middle ground (Aspelund et al. 2013; Piurko et al. 2011). We have shown that neither position is completely correct: while the meaning of left and right are not the same in post-communist democracies, our analysis comports the basic elective affinity that Jost (2006); Jost et al. (2009) argue for; i.e., that citizens bring psychological motives to their political understanding, and that the expression of these motives is conditioned on the actions of elites.

Finally, this research has important implications for the study of comparative political behavior more broadly. The left-right ideological spectrum is a useful construct, allowing a complicated political world to be simplified into more a manageable and understandable form. For this reason, it is no wonder that its use is ubiquitous in political discourse as well as scholarship on voting behavior and party politics. However, while being a meaningful construct, as we have shown, left and right are flexible labels. Instead of being associated with a fixed set of political views, in new democracies left and right can become linked with values that are the polar opposite to those established in the advanced-industrial democracies of the West. In other words, the left-right ideological spectrum does not lose meaning in these democracies, their meaning is simply different.¹⁷ This heterogeneity exposes a need for scholars to incorporate more flexible measures of ideology into cross-national research.

¹⁷See Zechmeister (2006, 170) for a similar warning about treating the left-right labels homogeneously across cases.

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Appendices

A Schwartz PVQ

Table 1: Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire, European Social Survey.

N	Variable	Schwartz value	Four values	Question description
1	ipertiv	Self-direction	Openness	Important to think new ideas and being creative.
2	imprich	Power	Self-enhancement	Important to be rich; have money and expensive things.
3	ipeqopt	Universalism	Self-transcendence	Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities.
4	ipshabt	Achievement	Self-enhancement	Important to show abilities and be admired.
5	impsafe	Security	Conservation	Important to live in secure and safe surroundings.
6	impdiff	Stimulation	Openness	Important to try new and different things in life.
7	ipfrule	Conformity	Conservation	Important to do what is told and follow rules.
8	ipudrst	Universalism	Self-transcendence	Important to understand different people.
9	ipmodst	Tradition	Conservation	Important to be humble and modest; not draw attention.
10	ipgdtim	Hedonism	Openness	Important to have a good time.
11	impfree	Self-direction	Openness	Important to make own decisions and be free.
12	iphlppl	Benevolence	Self-transcendence	Important to help people and care for others well-being.
13	ipsuces	Achievement	Self-enhancement	Important to be successful and that people recognize achievements.
14	ipstrgv	Security	Conservation	Important that government is strong and ensures safety.
15	ipadvnt	Stimulation	Openness	Important to seek adventures and have an exiting life.
16	ipbhprp	Conformity	Conservation	Important to behave properly.
17	iprspt	Power	Self-enhancement	Important to get respect from others.
18	iplylfr	Benevolence	Self-transcendence	Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close.
19	impenv	Universalism	Self-transcendence	Important to care for nature and environment.
20	imptrad	Tradition	Conservation	Important to follow traditions and customs.
21	impfun	Hedonism	Openness	Important to seek fun and things that give pleasure.

B Descriptive Statistics

Table 2: Summary Statistics of Left-Right Self-Placement, ESS 2002–2012.

	min	25%	median	mean	75%	max	sd
CZ	0.000	4.000	5.000	5.339	7.000	10.000	2.454
HU	0.000	4.000	5.000	5.378	7.000	10.000	2.341
PL	0.000	5.000	5.000	5.551	7.000	10.000	2.284
SI	0.000	3.000	5.000	4.743	5.000	10.000	2.325
SK	0.000	3.000	5.000	4.842	6.000	10.000	2.401

Note: Includes only those observations included in the item response models.


C IRT Model and Results

We have chosen to use IRT models instead of traditional data-reduction tools, such as factor analysis, because the method estimates factor scores directly instead of treating them as “by-products” of the procedure and masking parameter identifying assumptions as is often the case with factor analysis (Treier and Jackman 2008, 2002). IRT also has the advantage of being easily extended to ordered discrete responses and of effectively incorporating missing responses. This last point is crucial in using the PVQ with the left-right self-placement measures as both sets of indicators contain high levels of missing data. Since factor analysis depends upon correlations between responses, missing data is a serious issue, and is typically dealt with through list-wise or pair-wise deletion or with multiple imputation. IRT models, on the other hand, model individual responses, not correlations, and are thus able to handle moderate levels of missingness, while still estimating unbiased factor scores for those respondents. Finally, IRT models can include fixed or mixed effects to accommodate grouping in the data, which makes them ideal for inclusion in the mixed-effects model we employ in testing the messaging hypothesis.

Respondents’ scores on each of the psychological dimensions were constructed from four separate item response models for each country. While a single model (per dimension) was estimated for each country, temporal heterogeneity was permitted by allowing the item slopes (discriminants) to vary by ESS round. Item intercepts were fixed to facilitate comparison across time. To ensure that we were assessing quality responses, respondents were removed from the analysis if they had failed to answer 5 or more of the 21 questions or if they provided the same answer for 15 or more of the questions.¹⁸

¹⁸IRT models were estimated with `mirt` package (version 1.6, Chalmers 2012) in R (version 3.2.0, R Core Team 2015).

Figure 6: Mean Factor Scores for the Four Values Dimensions, ESS 2002–2012. The figure presents the mean factor scores for each of the four values dimensions for each country in the IRT analysis.



D Coding Values from the CMP

Our indices included the following measures from the Comparative Manifestos Project:

- **Conservation:** *National way of life* (positive mentions – 601): appeals to national ideal, nationhood, history, patriotism, and even the suspension of some freedoms to protect the state against subversion; *Traditional morality* (positive mentions – 603): favorable mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values, including censorship/prohibition of immoral behavior, support for religious institutions, and emphasis on family values; *Law and order* (605): favoring strict law enforcement, increasing support for police, cracking down on crime and emphasizing domestic security; *Civic mindedness* (606): appeals for national solidarity and the need for society to see itself as unified, decrying “anti-social” behavior during times of crisis; *Multiculturalism* (negative mentions – 608): appeals for cultural homogeneity and the enforcement of cultural integration; *Economic planning* (404): favorable mentions of long-standing economic planning by the government; *Protectionism* (406): favorable mentions of extending or maintaining protections of internal market through tariffs, quotas, and export subsidies, etc.; *Controlled Economy* (412): support for direct government control of the economy (price and wage control); *Nationalization* (413): favorable mentions /advocacy of government ownership of business and land.
- **Openness:** *Governmental and Administrative Efficiency* (303): Need to make govt more efficient and cheaper, including calls for restructuring or cutting down on civil service and bureaucracy; *Protectionism* (negative mentions – 407): support for concept of free trade and open markets and for less market protection; *National way of life* (negative mentions – 602): opposition to use of patriotism and nationalism or negative references about national history or state; *Traditional morality* (negative references – 406): opposition to traditional and/or religious values, including support for divorce / abortion, support for “modern family composition” and calls for separation of church and state; *Multiculturalism* (positive references – 607): favorable mentions of cultural diversity and plurality within domestic society, including preservation of autonomy in terms of religion, education, language
- **Self-enhancement:** *Military* (positive references – 104): importance of a strong military and calls for increasing its size; *Internationalism* (negative references – 109): negative references to international co-operation, favorable mentions of national independence and sovereignty with regard to the manifesto country’s foreign policy, isolation and/or unilateralism as opposed to internationalism; *European Union* (negative references – 110): Criticisms of the EU/EC both regarding general integration as well as specific EU policies/actions; *Freedom/Human rights* (201): importance of personal freedom and civil rights, including freedom of press, freedom from state coercion and bureaucracy, and individualism; *Free Market Economy* (401): favorable mentions of laissez-faire economics and superiority of individual enterprise over state controlled systems; *Welfare state limitation* (505): limiting state expenditures of social services and mentions of social subsidiary principle (private care/accounts etc.)

- **Self-transcendence:** *Military* (Negative – 105): negative references to military power, spending, or the use of force; *Peace* (106): any references on the importance of solving conflicts (devoid of military intervention); *EU positive* (108): Favorable references to joining EU or expanding cooperation with EU/ EC powers and competencies; *Market Protection* (403): calls for creating a more fair market through increased consumer protection, anti-trust, protecting small businesses against big corporations, and a social market economy; *Equality* (503): social justice and fair treatment of all people, including special protection for the underprivileged, removal of class barriers, ending discrimination; *welfare state expansion* (504): need to introduce or maintain any public service or social security scheme; *Underprivileged minority groups* (705): general favorable references to underprivileged minorities defined neither by economic or demographic terms (ie handicapped, homosexuals, immigrants)

E Details on the SUR Model

E.1 Model Overview

Let $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, I\}$ index individual respondents, $p \in \{1, 2, \dots, P\}$ the parties active in a particular period, while v indexes the four values: *Conservation*, *Openness*, *Self-enhancement*, and *Self-transcendence*. Then the response variable is defined as $y_{ip} = |y_i - y_p|$, the absolute difference in left-right score between respondent i and party p ; i.e., we are modeling the distance between an individual’s left-right self-placement and the placement of the party. The explanatory variables of interest are defined analogously as $x_{vip} = |x_{vi} - x_{vp}|$; the distance between the individual and the party on value v (there are four such distances given the four values). Finally, let $\mathbf{x}_{vi} = [x_{vi1} \ x_{vi2} \ \dots \ x_{viP}]$ be a vector of these distances for individual i on value v , \mathbf{X}_i be a $4 \times P$ matrix stacking these vectors of distances, while β represents a vector of 4 coefficients to be estimated on these values distances. So defined, the linear SUR model is as follows:

$$[y_{i1} \ y_{i2} \ \dots \ y_{iP}]^T \sim \mathcal{N}_P(\mathbf{X}_i^T \beta, \Sigma_P), \quad (1)$$

where Σ_P is a $P \times P$ covariance matrix for the multivariate normal distribution.

E.2 Model Specification

The models discussed in Section 6.1.3 were specified as follows. Normal priors center at zero with a standard deviation of 2.5 were used for the coefficients (intercepts and slopes for the distances on values). While not being a typical flat prior, since the response variable had a range from 0 to approximately 3, the priors on this scale remain quite diffuse. More diffuse normal priors were tested on select country-years but made no difference to the estimation, while the taking considerably more time to estimate. For the standard deviations, half-Cauchy prior with dispersion of 2.5 were specified, while an LKJ prior (Lewandowski et al. 2009) with parameter 2.0.

F Stan Code for Basic SUR Model

```
// =====  
// Latent Path Model: 4 Dimensional SUR Model  
// =====  
  
data {  
  int<lower=1> N; // number of respondents  
  int<lower=2> P; // number of parties  
  vector[P] conserve [N]; // distance on conservation  
  vector[P] openness [N]; // distance on openness  
  vector[P] enhance [N]; // distance on self-enhancement  
  vector[P] transcend [N]; // distance on self-transcendence  
  vector[P] y[N]; // response variable  
}  
  
parameters {  
  vector[P] alpha; // intercepts  
  vector[P] beta_c; // coefficient for conservation  
  vector[P] beta_o; // coefficient for openness  
  vector[P] beta_e; // coefficient for self-enhancement  
  vector[P] beta_t; // coefficient for self-transcendence  
  vector<lower=0>[P] sigma; // standard deviation  
  corr_matrix[P] Sigma; // correlation matrix  
}  
  
model {  
  matrix[P,P] Omega;  
  Omega <- quad_form_diag(Sigma, sigma);  
  Sigma ~ lkj_corr(2.0);  
  sigma ~ cauchy(0, 2.5);  
  
  // Coefficients  
  alpha ~ normal(0.0, 2.5);  
  beta_c ~ normal(0.0, 2.5);  
  beta_o ~ normal(0.0, 2.5);  
  beta_e ~ normal(0.0, 2.5);  
  beta_t ~ normal(0.0, 2.5);  
  
  {  
    vector[P] theta[N];  
  
    for(n in 1:N)  
      theta[n] <- alpha +  
        (conserve[n] .* beta_c) + (openness[n] .* beta_o) +  
        (enhance[n] .* beta_e) + (transcend[n] .* beta_t);  
  
    y ~ multi_normal(theta, Omega);  
  }  
}
```

G Descriptive Statistics for SUR Model

Figure 7: Continuous Measure of Respondent-Party Agreement on Left-Right Scale




Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Main Variables of Interest

Value	Min.	1st Q.	Median	Mean	3rd Q.	Max.	NAs
Left-Right Agreement	0.000	1.080	2.170	2.594	3.786	9.471	26301
Conservation	0.000	0.457	0.966	1.134	1.635	6.633	0
Openness	0.000	0.437	0.926	1.116	1.587	6.326	0
Self-enhancement	0.000	0.441	0.922	1.118	1.582	6.435	0
Self-transcendence	0.000	0.461	0.963	1.129	1.625	5.927	0